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Abstract
We extend the ASPIC+ framework for structured argumentation so
as to allow applications of the reasoning by cases inference scheme for
defeasible arguments. Given an argument with conclusion ‘A or B’, an
argument based on A with conclusion C, and an argument based on B
with conclusion C, we allow the construction of an argument with con-
clusion C. We show how our framework leads to different results than
other approaches in non-monotonic logic for dealing with disjunctive in-
formation, such as disjunctive default theory or approaches based on the
OR-rule (which allows to derive a defeasible rule ‘If (A or B) then C’,
given two defeasible rules ‘If A then C’ and ‘If B then C’). We raise new
questions regarding the subtleties of reasoning defeasibly with disjunctive
information, and show that its formalization is more intricate than one
would presume.
1 Introduction
When formulated in terms of the material implication connective ‘⊃’, the pat-
tern of reasoning by cases is valid in classical logic:
ϕ1 ∨ . . . ∨ ϕn, ϕ1 ⊃ ψ, . . . , ϕn ⊃ ψ ⊢ ψ (RBC⊃)
Many formalisms of non-monotonic logic likewise allow defeasible applica-
tions of reasoning by cases, where a formula ‘ϕ ⇒ ψ’ reads ‘If ϕ, then nor-
mally/usually/probably ψ’:
ϕ1 ∨ . . . ∨ ϕn, ϕ1 ⇒ ψ, . . . , ϕn ⇒ ψ |∼ψ (RBC⇒)
∗Research for this article was sponsored by a Sofja Kova-
levskaja award of the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation, funded by the German
Ministry for Education and Research. We are indebted to Leon van der Torre and Emil
Weydert for helpful comments and suggestions.
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In the context of formal argumentation, it is natural to include a more general
argumentative version of the RBC rule. Relative to a knowledge base this rule
would allow the construction of an rbc- argument C with conclusion ψ given
(i) an argument A with the disjunctive conclusion ϕ1 ∨ . . . ∨ ϕn, and (ii) for
each i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, an argument Bi with conclusion ψ based on an extended
knowledge base including ϕi. To the best of our knowledge, no such rule has yet
been introduced and studied in the context of formal argumentation. The aim of
this paper is to do exactly this, and to investigate the nature of ‘argumentation
by cases’.
For defining rbc-arguments and attacks on rbc-arguments, we will extend
the ASPIC+ framework [8]. ASPIC+ is a framework for instantiating ab-
stract argumentation frameworks as conceptualized by Dung [4]. We introduce
abstract argumentation frameworks in Section 2, and define our formalism in
Section 3. Our approach is limited in at least two ways. First, we do not allow
for nested or iterated rbc-arguments. Second, we do not yet take into account
priorities assigned to arguments, nor do we include undercutting attacks. The
removal of these limitations is left for future work.
The present approach raises new questions regarding the nature of arguing by
cases. For instance, what happens if in the rbc-argument C one of the arguments
Bi is rebutted by an independent argument? Is this a sufficient condition for
rejecting argument C? After all, there are n− 1 other defeasible ‘paths’ leading
to C’s conclusion. Our formalism implements a cautious rationale according
to which a successful rebut on one of its paths is indeed sufficient for rejecting
an rbc-argument. In Section 4 we show how this approach leads to intuitive
outcomes different from those obtained by other formalisms in non-monotonic
logic.
2 Abstract argumentation
A Dung-style abstract argumentation framework (AF) is a pair (Arg, Att) where
Arg is a set of arguments and Att ⊆ Arg × Arg is a binary relation of attack.
Relative to an AF, Dung defines a number of extensions – subsets of Arg – on
the basis of which we can evaluate the arguments in Arg.
Definition 1 (Defense). A set of arguments X defends an argument A iff every
attacker of A is attacked by some B ∈ X .
Definition 2 (Extensions). Let (Arg, Att) be an AF. If E ⊆ Arg is conflict-
free, i.e. there are no A,B ∈ E for which (A,B) ∈ Att, then (i) E is a complete
extension iff A ∈ E whenever E defends A; (ii) E is a preferred extension iff
it is a set inclusion maximal complete extension; and (iii) E is the grounded
extension iff it is the set inclusion minimal complete extension.
Dung [4] showed that for every AF there is a unique grounded extension. On
Dung’s abstract approach from [4], arguments are basic units of analysis the
internal structure of which is not represented. In what follows we will instantiate
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abstract arguments by allowing for the representation of their internal logical
structure.
3 Argumentation by cases
In this section we define structured argumentation frameworks (SAFs) for rea-
soning by cases. Our point of departure is an instantiation of the ASPIC+
framework (without priorities, without defeasible premises and without under-
cuts).
We adjust ASPIC+ in the following ways. (i) We define a new type of
argument called an rbc-argument (see point 4 in Definition 4). By means of
rbc-arguments, we can argue by cases in an argumentation formalism (Section
3.1). (ii) We generalize the attack relation so as to include argumentation by
cases, using the concept of a hypothetical argument (Section 3.2), and we define
a logical consequence relation for the resulting SAFs (Section 3.3). We briefly
discuss the meta-theoretical properties of our framework (Section 3.4).
3.1 Arguments
We illustrate our framework using the propositional fragment of classical logic
(CL) as our core logic. We denote the consequence relation of CL by ⊢. To ob-
tain the formal language L ofCL, we close a denumerable stock P = {p, q, r, . . .}
of propositional letters under the usual CL-connectives ¬,∨,∧,⊃,≡. We also
add the verum constant ⊤ and the falsum constant ⊥ to L. For reasons of trans-
parency we will sometimes use subscripted letters p1, p2, q1, q2, . . . as names for
propositional letters.
Definition 3 (Argumentation theory). An argumentation theory (AT) is a
triple AT = (L,R,F) where:
• L is our formal language defined above;
• R = S ∪D is a set of strict (S) and defeasible (D) inference rules of the form
ϕ1, . . . , ϕn → ψ and ϕ1, . . . , ϕn ⇒ ψ respectively (where ϕ1, . . . , ϕn, ψ ∈ L);
and
• F ⊆ L is a CL-consistent knowledge base.1
We assume in addition that ϕ1, . . . , ϕn → ψ ∈ S iff {ϕ1, . . . , ϕn} ⊢ ψ. Since
we keep L and S fixed, we will in the remainder refer to ATs as pairs (D,F).
Definition 4 (Arguments). Given an argumentation theory AT = (D,F), the
set of arguments Arg⊥(AT) contains:
1. A = 〈φ〉 where φ ∈ F
• Conc(A) = φ
• Sub(A) = {A}
1F ⊆ L is CL-consistent iff F 6⊢ ⊥.
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• HSub(A) = ∅
2. A = 〈A1, . . . , An → φ〉 where A1, . . . , An ∈ Arg⊥(AT) and
Conc(A1), . . . , Conc(An)→ φ ∈ S
• Conc(A) = φ
• Sub(A) = {A} ∪ Sub(A1) ∪ . . . ∪ Sub(An)
• HSub(A) = HSub(A1) ∪ . . . ∪ HSub(An)
3. A = 〈A1, . . . , An ⇒ φ〉 where A1, . . . , An ∈ Arg⊥(AT) and
Conc(A1), . . . , Conc(An)⇒ φ ∈ D
• Conc(A) = φ
• Sub(A) = {A} ∪ Sub(A1) ∪ . . . ∪ Sub(An)
• HSub(A) = HSub(A1) ∪ . . . ∪ HSub(An)
4. A = 〈A1, [A2], . . . , [An] φ〉 where n ≥ 3
• φ =
∨
{Conc(A2), . . . , Conc(An)},
• Conc(A1) =
∨n
i=2 ψi, Ai ∈ Arg
⊥((D,F ∪ {ψi})),
• and HSub(Ai) = ∅ for all 2 ≤ i ≤ n.
We have:
• Conc(A) = φ
• Sub(A) = {A} ∪ Sub(A1)
• HSub(A) = HSub(A1) ∪ {(A2, ψ2), . . . , (An, ψn)}
Definition 4 departs in two respects from the way arguments are usually
defined in ASPIC+. First, there is a new class of arguments constructed by
means of rule 4: these arguments are called rbc-arguments. They correspond to
applications of the reasoning by cases scheme outlined in Section 1.
Example 1. Let D = {⊤ ⇒ p∨ q; p⇒ p1; p1 ⇒ p2; p2 ⇒ r; q ⇒ q1; q1 ⇒ r}
and AT = (D, {⊤}). The following are arguments in Arg⊥(AT):
A1 = 〈〈⊤〉 ⇒ p ∨ q〉
A2 = 〈A1, [〈〈〈p〉 ⇒ p1〉 ⇒ p2〉 ⇒ r], [〈〈q〉 ⇒ q1〉 ⇒ r] r〉
A3 = 〈A1, [〈p〉 ⇒ p1], [〈q〉 ⇒ q1] p1 ∨ q1〉
A2 and A3 are rbc-arguments constructed on the basis of the ‘cases’ p and
q in the disjunctive conclusion of A1. Argument A2 concludes that r, while A3
concludes that p1 ∨ q1.
The second novel feature of Definition 4 is that we not only keep track of
an argument A’s conclusion (Conc(A)) and its sub-arguments (Sub(A)), but
also of its hypothetical sub-arguments (HSub(A)). These are pairs consisting of
an argument B and a formula φ, where B is constructible on the basis of the
extended AT obtained by adding φ to the knowledge base of the original AT. For
instance, HSub(A2) =
{(
〈〈〈〈p〉 ⇒ p1〉 ⇒ p2〉 ⇒ r〉, p
)
,
(
〈〈〈q〉 ⇒ q1〉 ⇒ r〉, q
)}
.
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A2’s hypothetical sub-argument (〈〈〈〈p〉 ⇒ p1〉 ⇒ p2〉 ⇒ r〉, p) contains
the argument 〈〈〈〈p〉 ⇒ p1〉 ⇒ p2〉 ⇒ r〉 constructible on the basis of the AT
(D, {⊤, p}).
Remark 1. If one is interested in reducing the size of Arg⊥(AT), one may
only allow for minimal disjunctions when generating arguments of type 4. More
precisely, where A1 is of the form 〈B1, . . . , Bm →
∨n
i=1 ψi〉 or 〈B1, . . . , Bm ⇒∨n
i=1 ψi〉, A = 〈A1, [A2], . . . , [An] φ〉 ∈ Arg
⊥(AT) only if there is no
∨
j∈J ψj
where J ⊂ {2, . . . , n} for which Conc(B1), . . . , Conc(Bm)→
∨
j∈J ψj ∈ S.
Definition 4 allows for the construction of arguments containing sub-
arguments the conclusions of which are jointly inconsistent, such as arguments
A1 and A2 in the following example, both of which rely on both p and ¬p in
their construction.
Example 2. Let AT = ({⊤ ⇒ s,⊤ ⇒ p, p⇒ ¬p}, {⊤}).
A0 = 〈〈⊤〉 ⇒ p〉 A2 = 〈A0, A1 → ¬s〉
A1 = 〈A0 ⇒ ¬p〉 A3 = 〈〈⊤〉 ⇒ s〉
When CL is used as the underlying logic, inconsistent arguments like A1 and
A2 may contaminate our formalism by blocking intuitively acceptable arguments
like A3. (This is because the conclusions of A2 and A3 are conflicting, causing
A2 to attack and exclude A3, cfr. infra.) Contamination problems of this kind
have been studied and tackled in ASPIC+ [3, 10]. We can avoid them by
filtering out inconsistent arguments.
Definition 5. We define †A for an argument A recursively as follows:
• †〈φ〉 = φ
• †A = φ ∧ †B1 ∧ . . . ∧ †Bn where A = 〈B1, . . . , Bn → φ〉
• †A = φ ∧ †B1 ∧ . . . ∧ †Bn where A = 〈B1, . . . , Bn ⇒ φ〉
• †A = φ ∧ †B1 ∧ (†B2 ∨ . . . ∨ †Bn) where A = 〈B1, [B2], . . . [Bn] φ〉.
Definition 6. An argument A is inconsistent iff †A ⊢ ⊥. Otherwise A is
consistent. Relative to AT = (D,F), Arg(AT) is Arg⊥(AT) without inconsistent
arguments.
For arguments without occurrences of  our definition of inconsistent ar-
guments is equivalent to that of [10]. In the remainder we will focus on the set
Arg(AT) rather than Arg⊥(AT), avoiding contamination problems.
3.2 Attacks
In ASPIC+, attacks are defined in terms of a generic contrariness operator.
We define them in terms of ‘¬’, so that arguments the conclusions of which
are classical contradictories attack each other. We have to be careful when
defining argumentative attacks when rbc-arguments are involved, since we must
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take into account the hypothetical sub-arguments of an rbc-argument. New
questions arise here. For instance, an argument’s hypothetical sub-argument
may conflict with a non-hypothetical argument.
Example 3. Let AT = (D,F), with D = {p ⇒ q ∨ r; q ⇒ s; s ⇒ v; r ⇒
v; t⇒ ¬s} and F = {p, t}.
A1 =
〈
〈〈p〉 ⇒ q ∨ r〉, [〈〈q〉 ⇒ s〉 ⇒ v], [〈r〉 ⇒ v] v
〉
A2 =
〈
〈t〉 ⇒ ¬s
〉
In Example 3, the non-hypothetical argument A2 is in conflict with the
argument 〈〈q〉 ⇒ s〉 ⇒ v, which belongs to A1’s hypothetical sub-argument
(〈〈〈q〉 ⇒ s〉 ⇒ v〉, q). The desirable outcome in this example is that A2 attacks
A1, but not vice versa.
As a further illustration, consider the following scenario.
Example 4. AT = (D,F), with D = {p ⇒ (q ∨ r); q ⇒ s1; s1 ⇒ s2; s2 ⇒
v; r⇒ v; q ⇒ ¬s1} and F = {p}.
A0 = 〈〈p〉 ⇒ q ∨ r〉
A1 = 〈A0, [〈〈〈q〉 ⇒ s1〉 ⇒ s2〉 ⇒ v], [〈r〉 ⇒ v] v〉
The following argument is constructible on the basis of the extended theory
AT′ = (D,F ∪ {q}):
A2 = 〈〈q〉 ⇒ ¬s1〉.
A1 contains the intermediate conclusion s2 based on the assumption q. How-
ever, A2 concludes that ¬s2 on the basis of the same assumption, q. The desir-
able outcome in this example is to let A1 and A2 attack each other, since these
arguments were both constructed on the basis of our knowledge base plus the
assumption that q, and since their conclusions are contradictories.
To handle examples like these, we introduce the set HArg(D,F) of all ar-
guments that can be constructed on the basis of some disjunct used in the
construction of an rbc-argument in Arg(D,F).
Where A is an argument and φ a formula, pi1(A, φ) = A and pi2(A, φ) = φ.
We lift the definition as usual: where i ∈ {1, 2}, pii(∆) = {pii(A, φ) | (A, φ) ∈ ∆}.
Where φ ∈ L\F , AT = (D,F) and AT′ = (D,F∪{φ}), we denote Arg(AT′)\
Arg(AT) by Argφ(AT).
Definition 7 (Hypothetical Arguments). Where AT = (D,F), HArg(AT) is
the set of all A ∈ Argφ(AT) such that φ ∈ pi2(HSub(B)) for some B ∈ Arg(AT).
Definition 8 (Attacks, Rebuts). For a given theory AT, we define a direct
attack relation
Att(AT) ⊆ (Arg(AT)× Arg(AT))
∪ (Arg(AT)× HArg(AT))
∪ (HArg(AT)× HArg(AT))
as follows: A directly attacks B iff B is of the form 〈. . . ⇒ Conc(B)〉,
(Conc(A) = ¬Conc(B) or Conc(B) = ¬Conc(A)), and
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• A ∈ Arg(AT) and B ∈ Arg(AT) or
• A ∈ Arg(AT) and B ∈ HArg(AT) or
• A ∈ Argφ(AT) and B ∈ Argφ(AT) for some φ ∈ L \ F .
We lift the definition recursively in the following way: A attacks B if A
directly attacks B or it attacks some C ∈ (Sub(B) \ {B}) ∪
⋃
pi1(HSub(B)).
For an argument A to directly attack an argument B, the following require-
ments need to be fulfilled: The conclusion of A conflicts with the conclusion of
B and (either A is non-hypothetical, or A and B are hypothetical arguments
based on the same assumption φ).
To illustrate how this works, reconsider our examples. In Example 3, 〈〈q〉 ⇒
s〉 ∈ HArg(AT) and A2 directly attacks 〈〈q〉 ⇒ s〉, so A2 attacks A1 (but not
vice versa). In Example 4 the arguments 〈〈q〉 ⇒ s1〉 and A2 are in Argq(AT), so
these arguments directly attack each other. Consequently, A2 also attacks A1.
3.3 Consequence relations
Definition 9. The structured argumentation framework (in short, SAF) defined
by the theory AT is the pair (Arg(AT) ∪ HArg(AT), Att(AT)).
Given a SAF, we can use the argumentation semantics from Section 2 to
define consequence relations:
Definition 10. Let SAF = (Arg(AT) ∪ HArg(AT), Att(AT)), let sem ∈
{Cmp,Prf,Grd}, and let Cmp(SAF), Prf(SAF), and Grd(SAF) denote the sets
of SAF’s complete extensions, SAF’s preferred extensions, and SAF’s grounded
extension respectively.
• SAF |∼∩
sem
φ iff for every B ∈ sem(SAF) there is an A ∈ B ∩ Arg(AT) with
conc(A) = φ.
• SAF |∼⋓
sem
φ iff there is a B ∈
⋂
sem(SAF) ∩ Arg(AT) with conc(A) = φ.
Since the grounded extension is unique both definitions coincide for sem = Grd.
Relative to a theory AT, the ‘virtual’ arguments in HArg(AT) are capable of
attacking arguments in Arg(AT) (in their hypothetical subarguments), and con-
sequently of preventing the derivability of conclusions of arguments in Arg(AT).
However, the conclusions of virtual arguments are never themselves derivable
from AT.
3.4 Rationality postulates
In [2, 3] several postulates were proposed to evaluate formalisms for structured
argumentation. In the present context these postulates read as follows. Given
a SAF (Arg(AT) ∪ HArg(AT), Att(AT)) where E ∈ Cmp(SAF):2
2The proofs of these properties are to be found in the technical appendix as indicated
below, except for te proof of non-interference which we omit due to space restrictions. The
authors in [2] distinguish between direct and indirect consistency: in our framework these
definitions are equivalent since our strict rules are closed under CL.
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Sub-argument closure: where A ∈ E , Sub(A) ⊆ E (immediate in view of
Theorem 1)
Closure under strict rules: where A1, . . . , An ∈ E ∩ Arg(AT) and
Conc(A1), . . . ,Conc(An) ⊢ B also 〈A1, . . . , An → B〉 ∈ E ∩ Arg(AT) (see The-
orem 2),
Consistency: {Conc(A) | A ∈ E ∩ Arg(AT)} is consistent (see Theorem 3),
Non-interference: Let Atoms(F) [Atoms(D)] be the set of all atoms oc-
curring in F [D]. Where AT = (D,F), AT′ = (D ∪ D′,F ∪ F ′), SAF =
(Arg(AT) ∪ HArg(AT), Att(AT)), SAF′ = (Arg(AT′) ∪ HArg(AT), Att(AT′)),
|∼ ∈ {|∼∩
Grd
, |∼⋓
Grd
, |∼∩
Prf
, |∼⋓
Prf
}, Atoms(φ) ⊆ Atoms(D) ∪ Atoms(F), and
(Atoms(D) ∪ Atoms(F)) ∩ (Atoms(D′) ∪ Atoms(F ′)) = ∅, we have:
SAF |∼φ iff SAF′ |∼φ.
The property of non-interference can be used to show that the present frame-
work avoids contamination problems of the kind discussed in Section 3.1 (see
[3, 10]).
4 Related work
4.1 Disjunctive Defaults
In [5] a generalization of default logic, disjunctive default logic, is proposed
that is more apt to deal with disjunctions than Reiter’s original approach. For
instance, given the default theory with p∨ q and the defaults p⇒ r and q ⇒ r,
r is not a default consequence in Reiter’s approach since the only extension of
this theory is Cn(p ∨ q). In disjunctive default logic, an alternative disjunction
| is available: p | q enforces that p or q is in any extension of the theory. So, for
the default theory consisting of p | q, and the defaults p⇒ r and q ⇒ r we have
two extensions, Cn({p, r}) and Cn({q, r}). Now r is a skeptical consequence.
Default consequents can also make use of |: a disjunctive default is of the form:
φ : ψ1, . . . , ψn
γ1 | . . . | γm
where φ is the prerequisite, ψ1, . . . , ψn are justifications, and γ1, . . . , γm are
consequents of the default. A set of formulas Ξ is an extension of a disjunctive
default theory consisting of the disjunctive defaults in ∆ (we here follow the
convention in [5] according to which ’facts’ are considered as disjunctive defaults
with empty prerequisite and empty justification) if it satisfies the following
requirements: (i) for any φ:ψ1,...,ψn
γ1|...|γm
∈ ∆, if φ ∈ Ξ and ¬ψ1, . . . ,¬ψn /∈ Ξ then
γi ∈ Ξ for some 1 ≤ i ≤ m, (ii) Cn(Ξ) = Ξ, and (iii) Ξ is minimal with
properties (i) and (ii).3
3This definition in [5] is suboptimal in that it gives undesired results: e.g. for the theory
∆ = {⊤ : ¬p
¬p
} also Cn(p) will form an extension. The problem can easily be fixed though by
defining extensions analogous to Reiter.
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We compare our approach to disjunctive default logic by thinking of ⇒
as a default conditional: ψ ⇒ φ encodes the normal default ψ:φ
φ
. We start
our comparison with the example given above. Let ∆1 = {p | q, p ⇒ r, q ⇒
r}. ∆1 has two extensions, Cn({p, r}) and Cn({q, r}) and so r is a skeptical
consequence. This outcome corresponds to our approach for the theory AT1 =
({p⇒ r, q ⇒ r}, {p ∨ q}): the argument 〈〈p ∨ q〉, [〈p〉 ⇒ r], [〈q〉 ⇒ r]  r〉 is in
all complete extensions of AT1.
Next, consider Poole’s broken arm example [9]. Let l be “having a left
broken arm”, r “having a right broken arm”, w “writing legibly”. On our
approach, the theory ATarm = ({w ⇒ ¬r}, {l∨r, w}) gives rise to the argument
〈〈〈w〉 ⇒ ¬r〉, 〈l ∨ r〉 → l〉, which is in all complete extensions of ATarm. In
contrast, the disjunctive default theory ∆arm = {l | r, w, w ⇒ ¬r} has two
extensions Cn({l, w,¬r}) and Cn({r, w}). Since l /∈ Cn({r, w}), l is not a
skeptical consequence in disjunctive default logic.
Finally, reconsider the AT from Example 3. There are various ways in which
we can translate this AT into a disjunctive default theory, e.g.4
∆3 =
{
p : q ∨ r
q | r
,
q : s
s
,
s : v
v
,
r : v
v
,
t : ¬s
¬s
, p, t
}
For ∆3 we have the extensions Cn({p, t, q, s, v}), Cn({p, t, q,¬s}), and
Cn({p, t,¬s, r, v}), so v is not a skeptical consequence. This corresponds to
our approach in which the argument A1 from Example 3 is excluded due to the
attack by A2. However, on our approach A2 is in all complete extensions, so
contrary to disjunctive default logic we obtain ¬s as a skeptical consequence.
4.2 The OR meta-rule
A different approach for dealing with disjunctive information is to allow for
inference rules that produce new conditionals from given conditionals. We, for
instance, find the following rule in system P [6] and in several Input/Output
logics [7]:
ψ ⇒ φ ψ′ ⇒ φ
ψ ∨ ψ′ ⇒ φ
[OR]
One could define an ASPIC+-like system where arguments are constructed as
in rules 1–3 in Definition 4, and in which the defeasible rules are closed under
OR. For instance, given AT1 from Section 4.1 this allows to derive p ∨ q ⇒ r
from p⇒ r and q ⇒ r, so that we can construct the argument 〈p ∨ q〉 ⇒ r and
obtain r as a consequence.
Adding OR is not sufficient to always get the intuitive outcome. Let AT4 =
({p ⇒ q ∨ r, q ⇒ s, s ⇒ v, r ⇒ u, u ⇒ v}, {p}). One would want to build
an argument for v, but we cannot put OR to much use (except for deriving
s ∨ u ⇒ v). We would have to combine OR with e.g. right-weakening (RW:
4Our discussion also applies if we translate p⇒ q ∨ r by p : q∧r
q|r
.
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ψ⊢φ ψ′⇒ψ
ψ′⇒φ ), or generalize OR to
ψ ⇒ φ ψ′ ⇒ φ′
ψ ∨ ψ′ ⇒ φ ∨ φ′
[gOR]
in order to produce q ∨ r ⇒ s ∨ u. Since also s ∨ u ⇒ v ∨ v can be derived,
we now have the means to construct the argument 〈〈〈p ⇒ q ∨ r〉 ⇒ s ∨ u〉 ⇒
v ∨ v〉 → v. In many systems of nonmonotonic logic, e.g. in system P and in
many Input/Output logics, OR and RW are available (and thus gOR is a derived
rule). We now contrast our approach with such (g)OR-based approaches.
A striking difference concerns the handling of Example 3. In the gOR-based
system we can construct:
A3 = 〈〈〈p⇒ q ∨ r〉 ⇒ s ∨ v〉 ⇒ v ∨ v〉 → v
This argument is not attacked by the argument t ⇒ ¬s. An alternative argu-
ment for v is given by 〈t⇒ ¬s〉, 〈〈p⇒ q∨r〉 ⇒ s∨v〉 → v. Recall that neither in
our approach nor in disjunctive default logic v is a skeptical consequence. Even
if we add ¬r to the knowledge base F in Example 3, v remains derivable in the
gOR-based approach since A3 remains unchallenged. This is counter-intuitive:
both the argumentative path via q ⇒ s⇒ v and the path via r ⇒ v are barred
in view of the unchallenged arguments t ⇒ ¬s and ¬r. An advantage of using
the reasoning-by-cases rule 4 in Definition 4 is that it provides more fine-grained
ways of tracking commitments in sub-arguments. This enables us to block the
undesired consequence v in this example.5
5 Conclusion and outlook
The ideas developed in this paper offer many interesting avenues for further
work, partially consisting of the removal of the limitations assumed in this paper.
For example, we did not consider nested rbc-arguments or various components
that can be modelled in the ASPIC+-framework such as defeasible premises, un-
dermining or undercut attacks. We also plan to present a less cautious variation
of this framework where an attack on an rbc-argument A, [B1], . . . , [Bn]  ψ
succeeds only if each of the Bi’s is attacked. In addition we will investigate
prioritized default rules in this framework. Here too, new questions arise. Con-
sider, for instance, an argument 〈p ∨ q〉, [〈〈p〉 ⇒ s〉 ⇒ t], [〈q〉 ⇒ t]  t. If
in addition there is an argument 〈⊤〉 ⇒ ¬s which is preferred over 〈p〉 ⇒ s,
then it seems intuitive to let the former attack the latter argument. But what
if the hypothetical argument 〈p〉 ⇒ s has a higher degree of priority than the
non-hypothetical 〈⊤〉 ⇒ ¬s? Should we decide in favor of the highest priority as-
signed, or should we never let a hypothetical argument attack a non-hypothetical
one? More generally, how do we lift the priorities assigned to the (hypothetical
and non-hypothetical) constituents of an rbc-argument? Difficult questions like
5An additional advantage is that argument strength can be tracked in a more fine-grained
way when using RbC in contrast to OR-based approaches. See also Section 5.
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these will have to be answered in order to resolve conflicts between prioritized
rbc-arguments.
In future work we also plan to investigate the use of an ordered disjunction
←−
∨ (see, e.g., [1]). For instance, a rule p ⇒ q
←−
∨ r can be read as: ‘If p then
plausibly q or r, where q is more plausible than r’. This is especially interesting
when measures of argument strength are considered and when thinking about
defeat of rbc-arguments based on ordered disjunctions such as 〈〈q
←−
∨ r〉, [q ⇒
s], [r⇒ s] s〉.
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APPENDIX
For the meta-proofs below it will be sometimes useful to speak about sub-
arguments in the following stronger sense. Sub′(〈A1, [A2], . . . , [An]  φ〉) con-
sists of Sub′(A1) and 〈A1, [A′2], . . . , [A
′
n]  
∨
{Conc(A′i) | 2 ≤ i ≤ n}〉 for every
A′i ∈ Sub(Ai) where 2 ≤ i ≤ n. For other types of arguments A (see Def. 3,
items 1-3), the definition of Sub′(A) is the same as the definition of Sub(A).
Note that for any argument A, Sub(A) ⊆ Sub′(A). In the following results, if
not specified further, SAF is a structured argumentation framework based on
the arbitrary argumentation theory AT. The next theorem is a strong form of
sub-argument closure:
Theorem 1. If E ∈ Cmp(SAF) and A ∈ E, Sub′(A) ⊆ E.
Proof. Let B ∈ Sub′(A). It is easy to see that every attacker C of B attacks A.
Since E is complete, it defends A and hence also B. Again, since E is complete,
B ∈ E .
Definition 11. Where Sub′(A) = {A1, . . . , An}, let Aˆ = 〈A1, . . . , An →∧n
i=1 Conc(Ai)〉.
Lemma 1. (1) A and Aˆ have the same attackers in SAF; (2) ⊢ †A ≡ †Aˆ; (3)
Where E ∈ Cmp(SAF), (3.1) if A ∈ E, Aˆ ∈ E; (3.2) if 〈A1, . . . , An → φ〉 ∈ E
and Conc(Aˆ1), . . . , Conc(Aˆn) ⊢ ψ, 〈Aˆ1, . . . , Aˆn → ψ〉 ∈ E.
Proof. (1) follows due to the fact that the set of defeasible conclusions of A is
the same as the set of defeasible conclusions of Aˆ. (2) follows by simple CL-
manipulations in view of Definition 5. For (3.1) note that, by (1), if some B
attacks Aˆ then it also attacks A. Since E is complete, Aˆ is defended and thus
in E . The proof of (3.2) is similar to (3.1) and left to the reader.
Theorem 2 (Closure under strict rules). Where A1, . . . , An ∈ E ∩Arg(AT) and
E ∈ Cmp(SAF): 〈A1, . . . , An → φ〉 ∈ E ∩ Arg(AT) if Conc(A1), . . . , Conc(An) ⊢
φ.
Proof. Let AT = (D,F). We show the statement by an induction over s =∑n
i=1 #Ai where #B is the number of rules from D and S applied in B. We
have to show two things: (i) A ∈ Arg(AT) and (ii) A ∈ E .
(s = 0) Then A has the form 〈〈φ1〉, . . . , 〈φn〉 → φ〉. Thus, φ1, . . . , φn ∈ F
and φ1, . . . , φn ⊢ φ. Since we assume our knowledge base to be consistent,
{φ1, . . . , φn, φ} is consistent and hence A ∈ Arg(AT). Since A has no attackers
and E is complete, A ∈ E .
(s⇒s+1) We first show (i). Assume for a contradiction that A ∈
Arg⊥(AT) \ Arg(AT). This means that †A1, . . . , †An, φ ⊢ ⊥. Since
Conc(A1), . . . , Conc(An) ⊢ φ this implies by transitivity that †A1, . . . , †An ⊢ ⊥.
Let n′ be minimal such that 1 ≤ n′ ≤ n and †A1, . . . , †An′ ⊢ ⊥. By the in-
duction hypothesis,
∑n′−1
i=1 #Ai ≤ s <
∑n′
i=1 #Ai which implies #An′ ≥ 1.
Let 〈B1, . . . , Bm〉 be a list of Sub
′(An′) ordered in such a way that for all
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1 ≤ i < j ≤ m we have Bj /∈ Sub′(Bi) and Sub′(Bj) ⊆ {B1, . . . , Bj}. Take
a minimal k such that 1 ≤ k ≤ m and †A1, . . . , †An′−1, †B1, . . . , †Bk ⊢ ⊥.
Then,
†A1, . . . , †An′−1, †B1, . . . , †Bk−1 ⊢ ¬ †Bk (1)
†A1, . . . , †An′−1, †B1, . . . , †Bk−1 0 ⊥ (2)
†A1, . . . , †An′−1, †B1, . . . , †Bk−1 ⊢ ¬Conc(Bk) (3)
(3) follows by simple CL-manipulations in view of (1) and since †Bk = †Bj1 ∧
. . . ∧ †Bjo ∧ Conc(Bk). We distinguish the following cases concerning the form
of Bk:
1. Bk = 〈Bj1 , . . . , Bjo ։ φk〉 where {Bj1 , . . . , Bjo} ⊆ {B1, . . . , Bk−1} and
։ ∈ {→,⇒}, or
2. Bk = 〈Bj1 , [Bj2 ], . . . , [Bjo ] φk〉 where for each B
′
j2
∈ Sub′(Bj2 ), . . . , each
B′jo ∈ Sub
′(Bjo) s.t. {B
′
j2
, . . . , B′jo} 6= {Bj2 , . . . , Bjo}, 〈Bj1 , [B
′
j2
], . . . , [B′jo ] ∨
{Conc(B′ji | j2 ≤ i ≤ jo})〉 ∈ {B1, . . . , Bk−1}
Consider case 1 with ։ = ⇒ (the case ։ = → is left to the
reader). By the inductive hypothesis, (3), Theorem 1 and Lemma 1, A′ =
〈Aˆ1, . . . , ˆAn−1, Bˆ1, . . . , ˆBk−1 → ¬Conc(Bk)〉 ∈ E . However, since also Bk ∈ E
and A′ attacks Bk, this is a contradiction to the conflict-freeness of E .
We now sketch the proof for case 2. By some basic CL-manipulations it can
be shown that for all j2 ≤ i ≤ jo
† A1, . . . , †An′−1, †B1, . . . , †Bk−1 ⊢ ¬Conc(Bji) (4)
We distinguish two cases: (a) for all j2 ≤ i ≤ lo, Bji is of the form
〈. . . → Conc(Bji)〉 and (b) there is a j2 ≤ l ≤ jo for which Bjl is of
the form 〈. . . ⇒ Conc(Bjl)〉. In case (a), †A1, . . . , †An′−1, †B1, . . . , †Bk−1 ⊢∨
{Conc(Bji) | j2 ≤ i ≤ jo}, which with (4) contradicts (2). In case (b), the
argument C = 〈Aˆ1, . . . , ˆAn′−1, Bˆ1, . . . , ˆBk−1 → ¬Conc(Bjl)〉 attacks Bk in its
hypothetical subargument Bjl . By the inductive hypothesis, (3), Theorem 1,
and Lemma 1, C ∈ E . This contradicts the conflict-freeness of E and completes
the proof of claim (i).
Suppose that some C ∈ Arg(AT) ∪ HArg(AT) attacks A. Clearly, C attacks
some Ai (where 1 ≤ i ≤ n). Since, by Theorem 1, Ai ∈ E , some D ∈ E attacks
C. Altogether this shows that E defends A and since E is complete, A ∈ E . This
is claim (ii).
Theorem 3 (Consistency). Where E ∈ Cmp(AT) and A1, . . . , An ∈ E ∩
Arg(AT), {Conc(A1), . . . , Conc(An)} is consistent.
Proof. By Theorem 2, A = 〈A1, . . . , An → ⊤〉 ∈ E ∩Arg(AT) which implies that
{Conc(A1), . . . , Conc(An)} is consistent since otherwise †A ⊢ ⊥.
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